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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Action For MisrepresentationBarred When Statute of Frauds
Denies Recovery on the Contract
Plaintiff had made an oral contract with defendant's agent for the sale to the
plaintiff of certain Georgia real estate, belonging to the defendant. Defendant
refused to convey. Conceding that the express contract was not enforceable by
virtue of an absence of a writing, GEORGIA CODE §20-401, (cf. N.Y. REAL
PROPERTY LAW §259) plaintiff brought his action in fraud and deceit to recover
damages as a result of his reliance upon the verbal promise. On petitioner's appeal
from a summary judgment, held, the whole purpose of the statute of frauds is to
prevent persons from being harassed by such oral agreements; and held also, the
false promise to sell land is no basis for a fraud action under Georgia law.
Cohen v. Pullman Company, 243 F.2d 725 (5th Cit. 1957).
Generally, a promise made without the intent to perform it is recognized
as a basis for a fraud action. Deyo v. Hudson, 225 N.Y. 602, 122 N.E. 635
(1919); Adams v. Gillig, 199 N.Y. 314, 92 N.E. 670(1910). Non-performance
alone is not sufficient to raise the issue of fraudulent intent. Adams V. Clark, 239
N.Y. 403, 146 N.E. 642 (1925); Levy v. Brusch, 45 N.Y. 589 (1871). Misrep.
resentations of the intent to perform constitutes the fraud. Ritzwollen v. Lurie,
225 N.Y. 464, 122 NE. 634 (1919).
There is a conflict of authority as to the right to maintain the tort action
when the promise is within the statute of frauds as in the case under discussion.
The weight of authority allows the action, one rationale being that proof of the
promise goes to establish the fraud and not the contract. This rationale is best
expressed in Burgdorfer v. Thielemann, 153 Or. 354, 55 P.2d 1122 (1936). A
strong minority of jurisdictions, including New York, deny the action. The
strongest case here expresses the view that the statute is a bar to any action which
is based upon an unenforceable promise. Dung v. Parker, 52 N.Y. 494 (1873).
The majority of the jurisdictions permitting the action base their decisions
upon the theory that the alleged fraud is an injury to the plaintiff independent
of the contract. Schleifer v. Worcester North Savings Institution, 306 Mass. 226,
27 N.E. 992 (1940). Opinions here view the action as collateral to the unenforceable contract. Nanos v. Harrison,92 Conn. 529, 117 A. 803 (1922). Such oral
testimony, it is said does not go to establish an agreement but goes to prove the
fraud. Burgdorfer v. Thielmann, supra; Nanos v. Harrison, supra; Schenley
Distillers Corporation v. Renken, 34 F.Supp. 678 (E.D.S.C. 1940). See also:
RESTATEMENT, TORTS §530, comment b (1938). Otherwise, the decisions feel
that the statute would be an aid in the prepetration of fraud. Nanos v. Harrison,
supra. One jurisdiction which permits the tort action has looked to the gravamen
of a plaintiff's action and held the statute a bar when it amounted to damages
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for breach of contract. Papanikalos v. Sampson, 73 Utah 404, 274 Pac. 856
(1929).
A minority bar the action as did the instant case. Authorities here point out
that a cause of action on the contract itself is barred by the statute of frauds.
Ossage v. Foley, 200 Ohio App. 16, 153 N.E. 117 (1923); Sachs v. Blewett, 206
Ind. 151, 185 N.E. 856 (1933). Such action by the plaintiff as in the instant case
is viewed as an attempt in an indirect manner to obtain damages for breach of the
contract. Canell v. Arcola Housing Corporation, 65 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1953);
Kiser v. Richardson, 91 Kan. 812, 139 Pac. 373 (1914) ;Cassidy v.Kraft-Phoenix
Cheese Corporation,285 Mich. 426, 280 N.W. 814 (1938). Decisions here point
out that the parties are deemed to know the law; plaintiffs are bound to know
that they have no action unless the contract is reduced to writing. Cassidy v.
Kraft-Phoenix Cheese Corporation, supra. Morever, it is pointed out that the
statute is aimed at the prevention of litigation over agreements not reduced to
writing that would harass persons and place their property in jeopardy without
the conformity to the statute's requirement of certain formalities. Cohen v. Pullman
Company, supra.
The controlling authority in New York is Dung v. Parker, spra. It was
there held that if proof of a contract, void by the statute, was required to maintain
an action there would be no recovery. It has been stated that Dung v. Parker
stands alone, that it is no longer followed in New York. Nanos v. Harrison,
supra. However, Special Term, relying upon Dung v. Parker, recently dismissed upon motion an action based upon facts very similar to those of the
instant case. The plaintiff argued upon appeal that the statute of frauds should
not be a defense to an action for fraud and that Dung v. Parker should be reevaluated because it was against the weight of authority. The Court of Appeals,
in a memorandum opinion, affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the complaint.
Redlark Realty Corporation v. Minkin, 306 N.Y. 762, 118 N.E.2d 362 (1954).
See also: Automatic Truck Loaders Corporation v. City of New York, 185 Misc.
649, 57 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. 1945) and Subriana v. Mundo, 282 N.Y. 726,
26 N.E.2d 828 (1940).
The instant case may appear harsh but the court has reached a correct result.
Contracting parties should be held to obedience to the statute's provisions; they
act at their peril for the statute warns them that no action will lie if the oral
promise is broken. Authorities for the majority view hold the defendant to a
liability even though the contract is not enforceable and allow a jury to determine
whether a fraud has been perpetrated. Such an action, by necessity, requires proof
of a promise; the statute has taken this determination away from the jury.
It has been suggested that another purpose of the statute of frauds is to
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impress the contracting parties with the solemnity and importance of their undertaking. This purpose is conceded. However, the theory remains that the statute
is also aimed at preventing persons from being harassed by such oral agreements
as in the present case. Avoidance of the statute should not be permitted by
allowing the plaintiff a choice of action by mere selection of a particular legal
theory.
Robert Kaiser
Monopolies-Restraintof Trade-Exclusive Automobile Dealerships
Appellant motor corporation appealed from a treble judgment in favor of
a former Packard car dealer in Baltimore, Maryland, for alleged violation of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§1, 2
(1952). The basis for the instant suit was an agreement between appellant and
Zell Motor Car Company, a retail dealer in the same area, wherein the latter was
granted an exclusive franchise to sell appellant's automobiles and the expiring
agreement of Webster Motor Car Company, plaintiff below, was to be cancelled.
Held (2-1): said agreement did not create an unreasonable restraint of trade or
amount to an attempt or conspiracy to monopolize within the meaning of the
Sherman Act. Packard Motor Car Company v. Webster Motor Car Company,
243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
Every contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several states or with foreign nations is declared illegal under Section 1
of the Sherman Act. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §1 (1952).
Until 1911 all contracts, combinations and conspiracies were per se illegal. That
year the Supreme Court in Standard Oil Company of N.J. v. United States, 221.
U.S. 1 (1911), articulated the now famous rule of reason. Generally the test of
reasonableness of an exclusive dealership agreement is its resultant effect on
competition, to wit, competition at the seller and buyer level. Fargo Glass and
Paint Company v. Globe American Corporation 201 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 942 (1953). The necessary corollary to this section and of
equal importance is Section 2 of the Sherman Act which prohibits monopilies or
the attempt to monopolize. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §2
(1952). It is well settled that the existence of a power to exclude competition
when it is desired to do so, provided it, is coupled with the purpose or intent to
exercise that power, constitutes a violation of this section. American Tobacco
Company v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809, 811, 814 (1946). In conjunction
with this principle, it is recognized that if an exclusive dealership agreement be
part and parcel of a scheme to monopize, that is, monopolization in the relevant
market, it will fall within the orbit of this prohibition. Fargo Glass and Paint
Company v. Globe American Corporation,supra; United States v. E. L d/,Pont de

